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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the current status of the Russian Federation’s ballistic missile 
submarine force. It reviews the history of the ballistic missile submarine force, its current 
status, and the implementation of plans currently in progress and as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a ballistic missile submarine force. This 
thesis also assesses the other two legs of the nuclear triad – the intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) and long range bomber aircraft. The status of these two forces and their 
operational advantages and disadvantages are compared with those of the ballistic missile 
submarine force. Also examined are the financial and political factors that may affect the 
prospects of the ballistic missile submarine force. This includes arms control treaties that 
may affect the force structure. Current and prospective energy prices suggest that the 
economy of the Russian Federation will be able to provide long term financing for the 
ballistic missile submarine force and Moscow’s other strategic nuclear forces. This thesis 
concludes that the ballistic missile submarine force is a vital part of the Russian 
Federation’s nuclear triad and will probably be maintained over the next 15 years and 
beyond. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS................................................3 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................4 
II. THE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE ..............................................5 
A. HISTORY OF THE SSBN FORCE ...............................................................7 
B. CURRENT STATUS OF THE RUSSIAN SSBN FORCE.........................11 
1. Service Life of Submarines ...............................................................12 
2. Project 667BDR (Delta III) Class Submarines................................13 
3. Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) Class Submarines ............................14 
4. Project 941 (Typhoon) Class Submarines........................................15 
5. Project 955 (Borey) Class Submarines .............................................16 
C. CURRENT PATH OF THE RUSSIAN SSBN FORCE .............................17 
D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BALLISTIC 
MISSILE SUBMARINES .............................................................................21 
1. Advantages..........................................................................................21 
2. Disadvantages.....................................................................................24 
III. THE COMPETITION...............................................................................................29 
A. ICBMS ............................................................................................................30 
1. Current Status....................................................................................30 
a. SS-18 (Satan)...........................................................................31 
b. SS-19 (Stiletto).........................................................................31 
c. SS-25 (Topol)...........................................................................32 
d. SS-27 (Topol-M)......................................................................32 
e. RS-24 .......................................................................................33 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of ICBM ........................................34 
B. ALCM .............................................................................................................35 
1. Current Status....................................................................................35 
a. Tu-95 (Bear)............................................................................36 
b. Tu-160 (Blackjack) .................................................................37 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of ALCM.......................................37 
C. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES .....................................................39 
IV. FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS..........................................................41 
A. POLITICAL FACTORS...............................................................................42 
1. Policies and Reform ...........................................................................43 
2. U.S. & Russian Nuclear Arms Treaties ...........................................47 
B.  FINANCIAL FACTORS...............................................................................50 
1. Defense Budget ...................................................................................50 
2. Financial Impediments ......................................................................53 
3. Financial Security ..............................................................................55 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................59 
 viii
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................75 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Scenario A for Future of Russian SSBN Force ...............................................18 
Figure 2. Scenario B for Future of Russian SSBN Force................................................19 
Figure 3. Scenario C for Future of Russian SSBN Force................................................20 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Current Status of Russian SSBN Force ...........................................................12 
Table 2. Number of Russian SSBN Patrols per year. ....................................................26 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABM   Anti-Ballistic Missile 
 
ALCM   Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
  
C3   Command, Control, & Communications 
 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
 
ICBM   Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
 
IRBM   Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
 
MIRV   Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle 
 
R&D   Research and Development 
 
RF   Russian Federation 
 
RVSN   Strategic Rocket Forces 
 
SLBM   Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile 
 
SLCM   Sea-Launched Cruise Missile 
 
SALT   Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
 
SORT   Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
 
SSBN   Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear 
 
SSN   Fast Attack Submarine, Nuclear 
 
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
 
VLF   Very Low Frequency 
 
VLW   Very Long Wave 
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Professor David Yost for his undying patience with me 
during this thesis process. His ability to create prose and amazing knowledge continues to 
impress me.  
In addition, I would like to thank Pavel Podvig. His expertise and willingness to 
assist my research was vital to the successful completion of this thesis. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife. Her ability to put up with the time spent on 
this thesis is greatly appreciated, and her support throughout is incomparable.  
 
 xvi




The purpose of this thesis is to analyze factors that may shape the future of 
Russia’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The objective is to reach 
informed judgments as to whether and to what extent the SSBN force will be able to 
survive in Russia in light of budget constraints, evolving political and strategic priorities, 
and competition from bomber aircraft and land-based missiles. 
One of the key issues is to what extent maintaining ballistic missile submarine 
capabilities is beneficial to the Russian Federation (RF). Will Russian decision makers 
abandon the SSBN force in favor of more reliable and financially affordable assets? This 
thesis examines the characteristics of the SSBN force, including stealth, command and 
control, maintenance concerns, survivability, and capabilities, and then analyzes its 
merits and shortcomings. Operational and deterrence mission competition from land- and 
air-based platforms is examined to assess their role in the future of Russia’s nuclear 
arsenal. Finally, budgetary competition from the rest of the navy is considered as yet 
another factor that may affect the prospects of the SSBN force. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“The Soviet Union will remain the only power on earth capable of destroying the 
United States, and modernization of Soviet strategic nuclear forces continues.”1 This 
statement in 1991 by Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, emphasizes the 
importance of Russian nuclear forces in shaping United States national security 
strategies. The Russian Federation has continued to modernize its nuclear forces and will 
remain a potential threat to the security of the United States and its allies. By assessing 
the probable future of Russia’s SSBN force, U.S. political and military leaders can ensure 
that the proper attention is given to it. This thesis attempts to determine what may 
motivate the Russian leaders to continue maintaining and modernizing the SSBN force. 
                                                 
1 Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1991), 2. 
 2
If the policy of the Russian Federation is changed to downsize to a nuclear dyad, 
political and military leaders will have to decide which platform to abandon. In the case 
of the ballistic missile submarines, there are contrasting views as to whether they make a 
cost-effective contribution to Russia’s deterrent force. Several experts have extolled the 
benefits of the SSBN force. Mikhail Barabanov, an expert with the Center for Strategic 
and Technological Analysis in Moscow, holds that the SSBN force is essential and that 
the Navy is attempting to maintain it. He quotes the Russian maritime policy, which is 
effective through 2010, that states that one of the primary missions for the Navy is 
providing strategic deterrence, and he declares that the Navy is attempting to support that 
objective by shifting more funds to the SSBN force.2  
Eugene Miaskinov, an analyst with the Center for Arms Control, Energy, and 
Environmental Studies in Moscow, has written several articles promoting the merits of 
the SSBN force in the strategic deterrent triad for Russia.3 Miaskinov’s arguments focus 
on the ability of the SSBNs to remain hidden from enemy forces. He states that the ability 
of the United States submarine force to detect, track, and destroy Russian submarines is 
overstated, and that the Russian ballistic missile submarines have a higher prospect of 
survivability than the other strategic forces and constitute Russia’s most reliable asset for 
second strike capability.4  
Although money may be the primary factor that will determine the future of the 
SSBN force, the current status of the bases and the potential for a nuclear accident might 
also affect their future. Michael Jasinski and Cristina Chuen of the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies have noted several examples of power failures at bases that 
                                                 
2  Barabanov, The Future of Russia's Strategic Fleet. 
3 Several of these articles are Eugene Miasnikov, "The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: 
Discussions and Arguments," http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/snf0322.htm (accessed 11 October 2007).; 
Eugene Miasnikov, "Collision of Two U.S. Nuclear Powered Submarines on March 19, 1998," 
http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/collisions/comm0319.htm (accessed 24 October  2007).; Eugene 
Miasnikov, "Future of Russia's Sea Based Strategic Forces," 
http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/rus/sea0215.htm (accessed 17 October  2007).; Eugene Miasnikov, 
"Find and Destroy," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (25 October 1994), 
http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/detection/rus/ng102594.htm.  
4  Miasnikov, Future of Russia's Sea Based Strategic Forces; Miasnikov, The Future of Russia's 
Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussions and Arguments. 
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support nuclear submarines, and have remarked that such power failures could result in 
casualties.5 Nikolai Sokov, an expert at the same center, notes that in the current 
modernization of the nuclear forces the SSBNs are second in priority after the ICBMs.6 
Rose Gottemoeller, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, relates this to the 
historical background of Russia being a land power. Ground forces have always taken 
priority over maritime forces in Russia. She also states that the desire of Russia’s leaders 
to be in control of their nuclear missiles and the possibility of losing communications 
with the submarines tend to focus the priority of the leaders towards the ICBMs.7 
Gottemoeller adds that the SSBN force was on the brink of becoming the predominant 
element of the nuclear triad when START II was in negotiation. However, due to events 
such as the failure of the START II treaty to enter into force and be implemented,8 delays 
in the new Borey class SSBN development owing to financial setbacks, missile 
technology failures, and the Kursk sinking in 2000, the SSBN force has slipped back to a 
lesser prominence.9  
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
The major question examined in this thesis is the following: What factors are 
likely to shape the future of Russia’s SSBN force, and what outcome appears to be the 
most plausible in the next 15 to 20 years? Related questions include the following: What 
merits does the SSBN force have over the other nuclear delivery systems? What are the 
major factors that might convince the Russian government to phase out the sea-based 
                                                 
5  Cristina Chuen, "Nuclear Issues in the Far Eastern Federal Okrug" in Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: 
Managing Decentralization of Russia's Nuclear Complex, eds. James Clay Moltz, Vladimir A. Orlov and 
Adam N. Stulberg (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 105; Michael Jasinski, "The 
Military, the Regions, and Nuclear Weapons" in Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Managing 
Decentralization of Russia's Nuclear Complex, eds. James Clay Moltz, Vladimir A. Orlov and Adam N. 
Stulberg (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 79. 
6  Nikolai Sokov, "Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia," 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm (accessed 17 October 2007). 
7  Rose Gottemoeller, "Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian Policy," in The Russian Military: Power 
and Policy, eds. Steven Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 184. 
8  This is further discussed in Chapter IV. 
9  Ibid., 185, 191-192. 
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nuclear deterrent? This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the Russian Federation is 
likely to address successfully the financial difficulties affecting the military, and that the 
ballistic missile submarine force will probably remain a key element in the nuclear triad 
and perhaps even become a more vital component in the future. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes the factors that appear likely to affect the future status of 
Russia’s ballistic missile submarine force. These factors are treated as independent 
variables that will affect the prospects of the dependent variable of interest – the SSBN 
force. Each independent variable is examined in a separate section of the thesis. The final 
section presents conclusions. This thesis relies on primary and secondary sources for 
information and analytical perspectives. 
The point of departure for the analysis, the subject of Chapter II, is the current 
physical condition of the SSBN force. This includes the current inventory of SSBNs and 
SLBMs, the status of shipbuilding and missile development and production, and the 
positive and negative aspects of SSBNs as a leg of the triad. The first independent 
variable, examined in Chapter III, is the status of the competition to the SSBN force. This 
includes an analysis of both the ICBM and strategic air forces and how they compare to 
SLBM capabilities. The other independent variable for the case study, considered in 
Chapter IV, concerns the political and military doctrine regarding the nuclear forces. This 
variable includes the political goals of the Russian government, support for defense 
spending, and the methods of maintaining financial support for the nuclear forces. The 
political goals of the Russian government appear to include the maintenance of the 
country’s great power status and international prestige. The thesis investigates the extent 
to which these status goals may generate support for the SSBN force. 
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II. THE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE 
"From the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, Russian rulers have 
felt that it was up to them to unite society by promoting state patriotism - namely, 
people's unity around the tsar (or the communist party leadership) thanks to their pride in 
belonging to and serving a strong state."10 During the Soviet period, this was routinely 
accomplished by promoting the state’s strong military might. The leaders wanted to 
prove to the population that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was mighty and that 
even the United States recognized the Soviet Union as an equal. The Soviet Union 
achieved superpower status through its ability to generate "enormous military power."11 
The ultimate bulwark of the Soviet state was its military power and force posture. 
Now that the Soviet Union has fallen, the Russian Federation has inherited many 
assets of the former superpower, but it has not obtained the level of international prestige 
that the USSR once held. Many Russians, including the political elite and military, do not 
want to abandon the goal of great power status and prefer to invest what is required to 
maintain the state’s prestige.12 Political and military leaders alike are determined to 
invest in the country’s nuclear weapons program in an effort to regain its “great power 
status.”  
In the March/April 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press 
published an article stating their opinion that the United States is about to emerge as the 
dominant nuclear power. They stated that in the absence of dramatic changes in either 
U.S. or Russian nuclear forces, Russia “will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy 
for many years to come.”13 This controversial article evoked many reactions in Russia 
                                                 
10 Vera Tolz. “Politicians’ Conceptions of the Russian Nation” in Contemporary Russian Politics: A 
Reader, ed. Archie Brown, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 358. 
11 Steven E. Miller. “Introduction” in The Russian Military: Power and Policy,  eds. Steven E. Miller 
and Dmitri Trenin, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004), 1. 
12 Ibid., 15. 
13  Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 
(March/April, 2006), 43. 
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and may have contributed to changes in Russian nuclear deterrence policy.14 In his 
speech to the Federal Assembly in May 2006 President Vladimir Putin declared that one 
of the main goals of the military forces was to ensure an increase in the number of 
strategic nuclear forces.15 Irina Isakova, a freelance analyst and an Associate Fellow at 
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), quotes Putin as saying that the cornerstone of 
Russian policy should be strategic deterrence and that it is necessary to ensure national 
security.16 
These were not idle statements by the Russian President. In the last few years 
there has been a large increase in spending on the military in general and especially on 
nuclear forces. The amount of money spent on national defense has risen every year since 
Putin assumed the Presidency in 1999-2000 and the proportion going to nuclear programs 
has increased as well.17 These trends have continued under Putin’s successor as 
president, Dmitri Medvedev, who took office in May 2008 and named Putin the Prime 
Minister.  
The Russian nuclear weapons posture includes three main categories of long-
range strategic delivery platforms: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); 
strategic bomber aircraft armed with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), short range-
guided missiles, and other weapons; and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs). The idea of a submarine lurking in an unknown location ready to launch 
multiple nuclear-armed ballistic missiles at unsuspecting targets is a formidable deterrent, 
and it is the cornerstone of the nuclear arsenals of Britain, France, and the United States.  
This thesis focuses on the Russian SSBN force and associated SLBMs. It gives 
some consideration to the other two legs of Russia's long-range triad:  ICBMs and 
                                                 
14  Irina Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2006), 2. 
15  Vladimir Putin, "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly," www.kremlin.ru (accessed 10 October 
2007). 
16  Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, 31. 
17 Jane’s, "Jane's Defence Budget: Russian Federation," www.jdm.janes.com (accessed 10 October 
2007).  
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strategic bombers.  It gives little attention to SLCMs and the many other Russian nuclear 
delivery systems and warheads that are not accountable under the 1991 Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START).  The non-START-accountable elements of Russia's nuclear 
posture include warheads for land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, 
nuclear-capable torpedoes, nuclear-capable anti-submarine missiles, nuclear-capable 
artillery, land-based tactical missiles, mines, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ballistic missiles, 
and gravity bombs and stand-off missiles for land-based naval aviation and other tactical 
aircraft. 
The Russian Federation currently has 14 strategic ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs) and two in construction. Development problems have delayed the completion of 
the ballistic missile for the Borey class SSBN, and the Russians are now struggling to 
maintain the older submarines in service until these development issues can be resolved. 
Isakova states that “during the last several years, national defense expenditures have 
increased on the order of 25-to-30 percent annually.”18  While the amount of defense 
spending has increased by around 30% per year, the majority of the money in recent 
years has gone to modernization and procurement rather than routine maintenance of the 
forces. While the government is spending more money on new projects, the current 
forces are deteriorating.      
This chapter focuses on the status of the ballistic missile submarine force. It 
considers the developmental history of the SSBN in the Soviet Union, the current 
inventory of submarines, the progress in future developments for the fleet, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a ballistic missile submarine force.  
A. HISTORY OF THE SSBN FORCE 
In order to effectively analyze the status of the Russian SSBN force and where it 
may be headed, its history needs to be discussed. When nuclear weapons were first 
placed on ships at sea their primary role was not strategic deterrence – that is, holding an  
 
                                                 
18 Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, 40. 
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adversary’s most valued assets at risk – but simply serving as another method of attack 
during naval combat operations.19 At the time, strategic deterrence duties were assigned 
to bomber aircraft. 
The first launch of a ballistic missile from a Soviet submarine was conducted on 
16 September 1955. Following that success the Soviet Navy began retrofitting five diesel 
submarines to carry the newly created R-11FM missile. These successes showed the 
Soviets the potential of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviets immediately 
began designing a new class of submarines, the Golf class, whose primary duty was the 
launching of the R-13 (SS-N-4) ballistic missile.20  
In 1958, the Soviets began construction of their first nuclear powered submarine, 
the K-19. This submarine would be the lead boat of an eventual 8 boat fleet of Project 
658 class ships, also known as the Hotel class. The construction of these nuclear-powered 
submarines helped eliminate a key disadvantage of the diesel submarines – having to 
surface regularly in order to replenish their batteries, thereby increasing their 
vulnerability to enemy detection. The design of the R-13 ballistic missile required it to be 
launched on the surface. This meant that the submarine was potentially surfaced for 15-
20 minutes in order to launch its complement of missiles.21 In addition to this 
vulnerability, the R-13 had an effective range of approximately 600 kilometers (324 
nautical miles) which would require the submarine to surface relatively close to its target 
and consequently within range of enemy anti-submarine assets. To remedy these 
shortcomings, the Soviets developed the R-21 ballistic missile (SS-N-5), which had a 
range of 1,400 kilometers (756 nautical miles) and could be launched from a submerged 
submarine at depths of 40-60 meters (131-197 feet).22  
                                                 
19 Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
2001), 235. 
20 Ibid., 237, 286. 
21 Ibid., 237. 
22 An excellent history of these developments can be found in: Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear 
Forces. 
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During this same time period, the United States took a different path of 
development. While the Soviets apparently did not initially intend to use submarine 
launched ballistic missiles for strategic deterrence purposes, in 1960 the United States 
launched the U.S.S. George Washington, the first SSBN specifically designed for 
strategic functions. Over the next 7 years the United States built another 40 boats of this 
class. These submarines were far superior to their Soviet counterparts in their operational 
performance characteristics, and each carried 16 Polaris missiles with a range of 2,200 
kilometers (1188 nautical miles).23 
The Soviets, sensing a strategic gap developing, responded by designing a new 
fleet of strategic missile-armed submarines that commenced with the development of the 
Yankee I class in 1958. These ships of the Project 667A (Yankee I) class were first 
commissioned in 1967 and were armed with 16 R-27 (SS-N-6) missiles with a range of 
2,400 kilometers (1,296 nautical miles). The Soviets eventually commissioned 34 of 
these second-generation submarines.24 
The new role of the strategic missile submarines and the short range of the 
missiles required the boats to utilize patrol areas relatively close to U.S. shores and within 
U.S. antisubmarine patrol areas. This was an obvious disadvantage and the Soviets 
worked on designing a missile with a longer range that would not require their boats to 
get as close to U.S. waters. In the early 1970s, the Soviets solved this dilemma with the 
creation of the R-29 (SS-N-8) ballistic missile. This missile, deployed on the Project 
667B (Delta I) class submarines, had a range of 7,800 kilometers (4,211 nautical miles), 
which allowed the submarines to launch their missiles at U.S. targets and still remain 
within Soviet waters.  
The new technology and longer range of the Project 667B boats and R-29 
missiles, also allowed new strategies to be developed for national defense. The Soviets 
created “bastions” in areas such as the Barents Sea, White Sea, Sea of Norway, and other 
                                                 




seas close to Soviet territory where they were well protected. They patrolled these areas 
with attack submarines, surface ships, and aircraft to detect any enemy presence. To 
further deter enemy ships and submarines from entering these bastions minefields were 
placed at key entry points.25 To further enhance the survivability of the submarines, they 
trained on new tactics such as surfacing through the ice and launching while pier side. 
While it would seem that launching while pier side would make the submarines more 
vulnerable to enemy attack, this was a new tactic and at the time it was considered safer 
to keep the SSBNs in port. It was unusual to launch from the pier and if the boat was in 
port the enemy might think that the SSBN was out of commission and that its launch 
capability was non-operational and therefore the boat might not be subject to enemy 
detection and attack. Another factor favoring the retention of SSBNs in port was the 
Soviet desire to maintain tight central control over launch options. 
The Soviets quickly learned the advantages of maintaining an SSBN force and in 
just 10 years they created a fleet of 56 SSBNs, limited to this ceiling by the SALT I 
treaty.26 In order to overcome this limitation, the next generation of submarines carried 
MIRVed SLBMs. This new class of submarines, Project 667BDR (Delta III), utilized the 
R-29R (SS-N-18) missiles, which had a range of 6,500 to 8,000 kilometers (3,510 to 
4,320 nautical miles) depending on the warhead configuration. These boats replaced the 
aging Project 629 class boats and were much quieter than their predecessors, enhancing 
the survivability factor.27 
Two other classes of SSBNs were developed during the Soviet reign and are still 
the cornerstone of the Russian SSBN force. They are the Project 941 class (Typhoon) 
with its R-39 (SS-N-20) missiles that have a range of 10,000 kilometers (5,400 nautical 
                                                 
25 Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 242. 
26 The SALT I treaty, approved in 1972, limited the USSR to 62 SSBNs with no more than 950 
launchers.  A text of the treaty is available at: U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT I),” http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html  (accessed 11 June 2008). 
27 Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 243. 
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miles) and the Project 667BRDM class (Delta IV) with its R-29RM (SS-N-23) missiles 
that have a range similar to that of the R-39 missiles.28 
By the end of the Soviet era, the core of the Navy was the SSBN force and much 
of the rest of the Navy functioned as its support staff. With the SSBN force split up into 
the Northern and Pacific Fleets, William Odom noted, “the predominant power of the 
Soviet Navy was in the Northern and Pacific Fleets to defend the SSBNs with their 
intercontinental nuclear striking power.”29 
B. CURRENT STATUS OF THE RUSSIAN SSBN FORCE 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ensuing disputes over territories and 
rights, and the end of the Cold War, the current Russian strategic submarine force is a 
shell of its former glory. The Soviet fleet peaked at 87 SSBNs in 1978 and has been 
steadily declining ever since.30 At the end of 2007, Russia was in possession of only 14 
strategic submarines, down from 22 in 2004.31 This includes several SSBNs that may be 
in the process of being decommissioned, one that has not finished sea trials yet, and one 
that has no operational missiles.32 As of mid-2000, Russian plans reportedly called for 12 





                                                 
28 Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 243. 
29 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1998), 80. 
30 The 87 SSBNs included 25 non-operational submarines in the USSR’s possession. The number of 
SALT I-accountable submarines peaked at 62 as allowed by the treaty and remained that high until 1990, 
when a steady decline commenced.  
31 Mikhail Barabanov, "The Future of Russia's Strategic Fleet," Moscow Defense Brief Journal, 
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2004/raf/tfotrsf/ (accessed 24 October  2007). 
32 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic Fleet,” http://russianforces.org/navy/, (accessed 31 January 2008). 
33 GlobalSecurity.org, “Project 935 / Project 955 Borei,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/935.htm, (accessed 31 January 2008). 
 12
 Number Commissioned Missile Warheads 
Project 667BDR (Delta III) 6 1976-1981 16 SS-N-18 3 per missile = 288 
Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) 6 1985-1990 16 SS-N-23 4 per missile = 384 
Project 941 (Typhoon) 1 1981 *  
Project 955 (Borey) 1 Est 2008 *  
Total 14  192 672 
Table 1.   Current Status of Russian SSBN Force 
 
* The lead ship of the Project 941 class is the only one remaining, and it has been 
converted to serve as the test platform for the new Bulava missile. The Bulava has not 
completed trials and therefore is not in full production or deployment. The Project 955 
boats are also designed to carry the Bulava missile. The lead ship of this class has not 
been commissioned and continues to undergo sea trials. 
1. Service Life of Submarines 
The service life of a nuclear submarine is dependent on several factors including 
operational time, the life of the reactor, and scheduled overhauls. The estimated service 
life for a nuclear submarine is 25 to 30 years, but this requires a major overhaul every 7 
to 8 years. Failure to perform this overhaul can reduce the service life of the submarine 
by approximately 15 years.34 It is fairly expensive to perform an overhaul or refueling of 
a nuclear-powered submarine, and during the Russian financial crisis during the 1990s it 
is doubtful that these overhauls were performed. According to Pavel Podvig, of the 26 
strategic submarines that Russia claimed as active in 2000, only 10 did not require an 
overhaul.35  
Some overhauls are being accomplished, however. In December 2007, the R-44 
of the Delta III class commenced sea trials following an extensive overhaul. In January 
2008, the K-117 Bryansk submarine left Severodvinsk to join the Northern Fleet. The 
recent overhaul of the K-117 is estimated to have extended its service life by at least 
another 10 years.36 Of the 6 operational Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class boats, this 
was the fourth boat of the class to complete an overhaul in recent years. There is still one 
                                                 
34 Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 244. 
35 Ibid., 245. 
36 Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, “Bryansk Nuclear Sub Returning To Northern Fleet,” 17 January 
2008, reported and translated by OpenSource.gov, 17 January 2008, CEP20080117950152. 
 13
boat of the class in overhaul and another is expected to commence its overhaul shortly. 37 
The Project 941 Typhoon class also completed a conversion and overhaul in 2002 to be 
able to test the next generation ballistic missile, the Bulava.38 Such overhauls have been 
rare and appear unlikely to stave off the shrinking of the SSBN force.  
2. Project 667BDR (Delta III) Class Submarines 
The SSBN force is expected to lose a significant portion of its fleet in a few years, 
the Delta III class submarines. Original plans of the Russian Navy stated that these 
submarines were to be phased out by 2007.39 Of the six that are still considered 
operational, four are stationed in the Pacific Fleet and two in the Northern Fleet. While 
the Russians claim to have six operational submarines in this class, two of these 
submarines appear to be undergoing decommissioning.40  
As previously stated, the service life of a submarine averages 25 to 30 years. 
Based on the commissioning dates of the Project 667BDR (Delta III) submarines, these 
boats have exceeded their operational lifetimes. Even if the submarines themselves are 
overhauled and refueled and can structurally last for another 10 years, they may be 
strategically defunct owing to the doubtful reliability of their SLBMs. As stated above, 
these Project 667BDR submarines utilize the D-9R missile system which includes 16 R-
29R (SS-N-18) missiles. Sea based missiles are exposed to a harsher environment than 
land- or air-based missiles, and subsequently have a shorter life span. The initial life of 
these missiles is estimated to be about 10 years.41 Although this life can be extended 
                                                 
37 Podvig, “Strategic Fleet.” 
38 Janes, “Submarine Forces, Russian Federation,” 
http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/yb/juws/juws2170.htm@curr
ent&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=bulava&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JU
WS&, (accessed 31 January 2008). 
39 In his book written in 2000, Nikolai Sokov stated that the original expiration date was 2000, but 
extended to 2005. Podvig states that the plans are for 2007, but was unexpected to last past 2003. Nikolai 
Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future (Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, 2000), 126; Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 245. 
40 Podvig, “Strategic Fleet.” 
41 Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye “Development of Navy Strategic Forces Eyed,” 11 
December 1998, reported and translated by OpenSource.gov, 11 December 1998, FTS19981217000130. 
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through testing, this adds to the uncertainties associated with these older submarines. 
Given the operational service date of these submarines, the missiles are almost certainly 
past their operational expiration date and are no longer strategically reliable. There have 
been no signs or reports that the Delta III submarine will or can be converted to carry the 
newer R-29RM Sineva missile.  
Why have the Russians kept these submarines in operation, and why did they just 
overhaul one? No conclusive answers to this question are available. However, owing to 
the developmental problems associated with the Bulava missile system (to be discussed 
later), the Russians may have chosen to maintain these submarines in service to 
supplement numbers on paper. With 12 SSBNs as the last published force structure 
minimum, these submarines help to fulfill the quota and may help to deter Russia’s 
adversaries, even if their operational reliability is questionable. There are also reports that 
the K-44 Ryazan, a Delta III SSBN, may have been overhauled to become a new launch 
platform for the Volna space launcher, a task it performed before in 2002.42 
3. Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) Class Submarines 
Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines are considered the workhorses of the 
Russian SSBN fleet. The Delta IV class was first introduced into the Soviet fleet in 1984. 
These submarines are the last in the line of the Project 667 boats and have improved 
construction and noise reduction capabilities over their predecessors. Over the last few 
years, four of the six remaining Project BDRM submarines have completed intensive 
overhauls. As stated earlier, one of the submarines is still in overhaul, and Podvig expects 
the remaining submarine to enter the shipyard soon.43 All of these submarines are based 
in the Northern Fleet. 
                                                 
42 Pavel Podvig, “Project 667BDR submarines are staying?” 
http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/09/project_667bdr_submarines_are.shtml, (accessed 29 January 2008). 
43 Pavel Podvig, “Bryansk submarine is back from overhaul” 
http://russianforces.org/blog/2008/01/bryansk_submarine_is_back_from.shtml, (accessed 29 January 
2008). 
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Following their maintenance, these submarines are expected to be in service for 
another 10 years.44 This would correspond to the normal 25 to 30 year life expectancy of 
the boats and also to the estimated missile service life of 10 years. These submarines are 
being modified to carry the R-29RM Sineva missile. The original version of this missile 
was discontinued in 1998, but it has been modified to carry multiple warheads.45 The 
missiles are designed to carry 4 or 10 MIRVed warheads, but only the 4 warhead version 
is currently being produced. The Project 667BDRM SSBN can carry 16 Sineva missiles, 
and this corresponds to a total payload of 64 warheads. 
The latest reports indicate some developmental delays in the production and 
deployment of the R-29RM Sineva missile. Nevertheless, the few missiles that have been 
produced are carried on the K-114 Tula, which appears to be the only fully operational 
Project 667BDRM submarine. Two other submarines have completed their overhaul and 
sea trials and are awaiting missiles, while the K-117 Bryansk has completed refit but not 
sea trials. The final two submarines in the class are awaiting overhaul and refit for the R-
29RM missile.46 
4. Project 941 (Typhoon) Class Submarines 
The Typhoon class submarines are virtually extinct. Only one boat remains of this 
class of giant ballistic missile submarines. These submarines, which were first 
commissioned in 1980, were armed with the D-19 missile system consisting of 20 R-39 
ballistic missiles. The original plan for these submarines was to upgrade the missile 
system and rearm the boats after the initial service life of the missiles expired, but the 
plans were scrapped due to the financial crisis in the late 1990s. When the R-39 missiles 
reached the end of their useful service life, all but one of the associated submarines were 
decommissioned.47 The sole submarine of this class still on active service, the TK-208 
                                                 
44 Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, “Bryansk Nuclear Sub Returning To Northern Fleet.” 
45 Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 335. 
46 Pavel Podvig, “Project 667BRDM submarines and Sineva missiles,” 
http://russianforces.org/blog/2008/04/project_667brdm_submarines_and.shtml#comments (accessed 1 
April 2008). 
47 Ibid., 306. 
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Dmitry Donskoy, had its missile tubes converted to hold the SS-NX-30 (RSM-56 under 
START nomenclature) Bulava missile. Due to delays in construction of the Project 955 
(Borey) SSBN class, the Project 941 (Typhoon) boat is being used to test the new missile 
for future use.  Due to restrictions in the START I reporting data the missiles that were 
associated with this class of submarines are still counted as “active” until the 
decommissioned Typhoon boats are no longer considered valid launchers. 
5. Project 955 (Borey) Class Submarines 
In late 1996, the shipyard in Severodvinsk commenced building a new ballistic 
submarine class known as the Project 955 class (Borey class). The lead ship of the series, 
Yury Dolgoruky, was initially planned to be completed in 2002, with one ship per year to 
follow. Due to financial constraints that deadline was postponed. The Yury Dolgoruky 
was finally launched in mid 2007 and is expected to complete sea trials in 2008.48 The 
other two ships in construction, the Alexander Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh, are 
also behind schedule and will not be delivered as planned. According to published 
Russian plans, the Alexander Nevsky, which began construction in 2004, is expected to be 
launched in 2010; and the Vladimir Monomakh, which began construction in 2006, will 
be launched in 2011.49 Four boats of this class are currently planned. In December 2007, 
Deputy Defence Minister Army General Nikolai Makarov insisted that the Russian Navy 
would receive the Yury Dolgoruky in 2008 complete with her Bulava missiles.50 
However, in January 2008 it was announced that the Bulava may not enter operational 
service until 2012.51 This announcement suggests that the Russian authorities will have to 
decide whether to continue with this class of submarines or switch to a new class that will 
support the Sineva missile complex. The Project 955 class submarines are expected to 
                                                 
48 Podvig, “Strategic Fleet.” 
49 Forum, “Russia: Strategic Nuclear Forces Activity Said To Be Nothing But ‘PR’,” 17 December 
2007, reported and translated by OpenSource.gov, 17 December 2007, CEP20071217009005. 
50 ITAR-TASS, “RF Navy To Get Yuri Dolgoruky Submarine In 2008 - Dep DM (Adds),” 22 
December 2007, reported and translated by OpenSource.gov, 22 December 2007, CEP20071222950108. 
51 Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, “Russia: Expert Backs Tried, Tested Sineva Technology 
Over Failing Bulava,” 25 January 2008, reported and translated by OpensSource.gov, 25 January 2008, 
CEP20080125548013. 
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have 16 missile tubes for Bulava missiles. The missile is expected to be armed with 6 
MIRVed warheads, which will allow each Borey class SSBN to have a payload of 96 
warheads.  This is consistent with the 36 Bulava missiles already deployed – 20 on the 
Dmitry Donskoy (Typhoon) and 16 on the Yuri Dolgoruky (Borey) reported in the latest 
publicly available START I data as of January 2008.52 
C. CURRENT PATH OF THE RUSSIAN SSBN FORCE 
One of the major hindrances in the development of the Russian SSBN force has 
been the failure of the Bulava missile to complete its test flights. The missile was first 
developed in 1997 after its predecessor, the SS-N-28 Bark, failed to operate correctly in 
three test flights. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) proposed to the 
military that it could produce a better model, and that this model would be similar to the 
one it was already developing for the Strategic Rocket Forces. This would then save the 
military money by having two missiles so similar in design that parts could be 
interchangeable.53 At the end of 2007 there had been only three successful launches out 
of seven attempts. Two of those reported successes were questionable due to 
unconfirmed reports of problems with the warheads.54 There is no solid estimate of when 
these missiles will be accepted for operational use on the Project 955 class submarines. 
Based on the Bulava’s test history, Podvig does not expect the Yury Dolgoruky to begin 
operational service until 2009 or later.55 
Therefore, in reality, the Russian Navy currently has only five submarines – all 
Delta IVs - that are reliably capable of launching ballistic missiles. This is assuming that 
the R-29R missiles that are on the Project 667BDR (Delta III) class boats are 
                                                 
52 U.S. Department of State, “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms” 
http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/2008/102844.htm (accessed 20 April 2008). 
53 Forum, “Russia Seen Facing Total Lack of Nuclear-Armed Submarines,” 5 December 2007, 
reported and translated by OpenSource.gov, 5 December 2007, CEP20071206009001. 
54 Pavel Podvig, “Bulava test history,”  
http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/11/bulava_test_history.shtml, (accessed 31 January 2008). 
55 Pavel Podvig, “Russian Forces at the end of 2007,”  
http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/12/russian_forces_at_the_end_of_2.shtml, (accessed 31 January 2008). 
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operationally unreliable and the five Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class submarines not 
in overhaul are fully loaded. The Delta IV boats may not all be sea-worthy, but they 
could be launch ready at the pier. These submarines are expected to last another 10 years 
and begin phasing out no later than 2015 based on the Tula’s overhaul completion date.  
The following charts (Figures 1, 2, and 3) represent three potential scenarios for 
the future inventory of the SSBN force based on current data, trends, and analyst 
opinions: 
 
Figure 1.   Scenario A for Future of Russian SSBN Force 
The above scenario, Scenario A, consists of the following assumptions: 
• The minimum force structure of the SSBN force is 12 submarines. 
• The Project 667BDR submarines are non-operational. 
• The Project 667BDRM submarines will phase out at a rate of one boat per 
year commencing 2015 based on hull and missile life. 
• The Bulava will complete testing and enter operational service in 2009. 
• The Typhoon will briefly re-enter service but be decommissioned in 2010 
after 30 years of service. 
• The Yury Dolgoruky will be commissioned in 2009, Alexander Nevsky in 
2010, and Vladimir Monomakh in 2011. 
• The Russian Navy will commence construction of another new Project 
955 class submarine in 2008 and every year thereafter until  2016. 
• The Russian Navy will complete construction and trials of all new Project 
955 class submarines in 3 years. 
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Scenario A is perhaps the most ambitious plan the Russian Federation could 
afford to implement for its SSBN force. With this plan, the RF would achieve its goal of 
12 submarines relatively quickly, and by 2019 its fleet would consist entirely of Project 
955 class submarines that would not reach the end of their 25-year service life until 
beginning in 2033. At this point the SSBN force will control 1152 warheads, which 
correlates to 52% of the ceiling of 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which is also known as the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (SORT). 56 This plan would also give the RF 14 years from the last 
completed Project 955 class boat until it would need to start commissioning a new fleet 
of boats to replace the aging Borey class. 
 
Figure 2.   Scenario B for Future of Russian SSBN Force 
 
The above scenario, Scenario B, consists of the following assumptions: 
• The minimum force structure of the SSBN force is 12 submarines. 
• The Project 667BDR submarines are non-operational. 
• The Project 667BDRM submarines will phase out at a rate of one boat per 
year commencing 2015 based on hull and missile life. 
• The Bulava will complete testing and enter operational service in 2009. 
                                                 
56 U.S. Department of State, “Moscow Treaty,” http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm, (accessed 29 
January 2008). The Moscow Treaty runs to 31 December 2012, and it is unclear whether it will be amended 
or replaced by another treaty regime that might affect the Russian SSBN force. 
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• The Typhoon will briefly re-enter service but be decommissioned in 2010 
after 30 years of service. 
• The Yury Dolgoruky will be commissioned in 2009, Alexander Nevsky in 
2010, and Vladimir Monomakh in 2011. 
• The Russian Navy will commence construction of another new Project 
955 class submarine in 2008 and every year thereafter until  2016. 
• The Russian Navy will complete construction and trials of all new Project 
955 class submarines in 5 years. 
Scenario B is a little more realistic for the completion time of a Project 955 
(Borey) class submarine based on current trends. With this plan, the force would reach 
the desired number of 12 submarines in 2021.  
 
Figure 3.   Scenario C for Future of Russian SSBN Force 
 
The above scenario, Scenario C, consists of the following assumptions: 
• The Project 667BDR submarines are non-operational. 
• The Project 667BDRM submarines will phase out at a rate of one boat per 
year commencing 2015 based on hull and missile life. 
• The Bulava will complete testing and enter operational service in 2009. 
• The Typhoon will briefly re-enter service but be decommissioned in 2010 
after 30 years of service. 
• The Yury Dolgoruky will be commissioned in 2009, Alexander Nevsky in 
2010, and Vladimir Monomakh in 2011. 
• The Russian Navy will not build any more submarines of the Project 955 
class. 
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Scenario C illustrates what might happen with the current inventory and boats in 
construction if the RF chose not to continue to build the Project 955 class boats. Within 
10 years the SSBN force would start shrinking by one boat per year, and by 2021 it 
would consist of only the 3 Project 955 class submarines. They would account for only 
288 warheads, which is 13% of the total warheads currently allowed under the Moscow 
Treaty. If this scenario became reality, it would signify a drastic reduction of the SSBN 
force within the Russian triad. The force level would be reduced to a level comparable to 
that of France and the United Kingdom. 
D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BALLISTIC MISSILE 
SUBMARINES 
1. Advantages 
The most predominant advantage of a nuclear-armed submarine fleet is stealth. 
This stealth, the submarine’s ability to evade detection and to constantly change its 
location, directly relates to one of the most important factors in nuclear weapons 
deployment: survivability. Miasnikov states that several Russian critics of the SSBN 
force argue that the SSBNs are more vulnerable to tracking by the enemy than mobile 
ICBMs are, and that the SSBNs could be easily destroyed by conventional methods. In 
Miasnikov’s view, the judgments of these critics are mistaken and grossly exaggerated.57 
Due to their inherent stealth and constantly changing location, it would be 
effectively impossible to destroy all of Russia’s SSBNs. Unlike the silo-based ICBMs, 
they are not in a set location. Effectively neutralizing the SSBNs would require a constant 
tracking of all the SSBNs at sea. There are several problems associated with this method. 
First, one would need to find each SSBN. Even if satellite imagery showed the submarine 
leaving port, once the SSBN submerged it would need to be located and a trail 
maintained. This would be difficult because longer range missiles allow SSBNs to stay 
within their local waters, where they are not subject to fixed underwater detection 
devices. In an article published in 1998, Miasnikov tabulated the estimated detection 
                                                 
57 Eugene Miasnikov, "The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussions and Arguments," 
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/snf0322.htm  (accessed 11 October 2007). 
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ranges of the current fleet of SSBNs based on his knowledge of U.S. Los Angeles class 
submarine technology. His estimates showed that U.S. SSNs would have to be extremely 
close to a Russian SSBN in order to have a decent probability of detecting it. While he 
did not have any data on the Project 955 (Borey) class SSBNs, he estimated that Russian 
SSBNs were virtually undetectable.58 
Miasnikov may not be completely accurate in his estimates due to the classified 
nature of U.S. detection ability. However, even if the detection ranges were doubled, it 
would require a significant array of assets to destroy the Russian SSBN fleet. As stated 
earlier, the most effective method of tracking the SSBNs would be to start at the 
homeport; otherwise it would be difficult to find the submarines in the open ocean. If the 
Russians deployed 20% of their current nominal SSBN force of 14 boats, two or three 
submarines, and they were not detected upon leaving the homeport, to effectively detect 
them in open water would be a substantial challenge. It would take at least two SSNs to 
detect one Russian SSBN. It would require approximately 50% of the United Kingdom 
SSN fleet or approximately 10% of the U.S. SSN fleet to detect a single Russian SSBN. 
It would be unrealistic for either fleet to dedicate that percentage of its forces to tracking 
Russian SSBNs. As global threats have changed since the end of the Cold War in 1989-
1991, the role of submarines has shifted away from anti-submarine warfare. New 
missions such as intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR); Tomahawk missile 
strikes; and special force operations help provide vital support for ensuring national 
security. 
This discussion leads back to the primary advantage of an SSBN force: 
survivability. Since it is highly improbable that all the deployed Russian SSBNs could be 
constantly tracked, they constitute the ideal platform for a secure second-strike capability. 
Even if one assumed that all but one of the Russian SSBNs was destroyed in an initial 
attack and that the remaining submarine was of the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class 
with a full payload of 16 ballistic missiles with 4 warheads each, this sole remaining 
SSBN could strike 64 targets. 
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This leads to the other major advantage of maintaining an SSBN force. With the 
current fleet of six Project 667BDR (Delta III) and six Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) 
SSBNs, the SSBN force provides 192 SLBMs and 672 warheads –that is, a total of 31% 
of the accountable warheads allowed under the Moscow Treaty when the numbers are 
reached in 2012. The SSBNs could control 100% of the 2,200 allowable warheads with 
as few as 34 Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines or 31 Project 955 (Borey) 
submarines. The R-29RM Sineva SLBM is capable of carrying 10 warheads; and if it was 
equipped with this many warheads, it would dramatically increase the number of 
warheads attributed to the sea-based nuclear forces. The Russians are concurrently 
developing the RS-24 ICBM, the MIRVed version of the Topol-M that also has the 
capacity to carry 10 warheads per missile (to be discussed in Chapter III), but it would 
require 68 of these ICBMs to equal the payload of 12 Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) 
SSBNs. These ICBMs also require their crews, a silo, or a mobile launcher, which adds 
to the operational cost of maintaining them. According to Rose Gottemoeller, “In a 
burgeoning nuclear crisis, the United States might be tempted to preempt those forces 
[MIRVed ICBMs], hitting them early and hard in an attempt at a disarming first strike.”59  
To operate a nuclear submarine at sea is not an inexpensive task. For the 
submarine to be operational, it needs to have adequate supplies for the crews, the crews 
need to be operationally trained, and the submarine has to be in perfect working 
condition. Some could argue that these costs outweigh the benefits, that the Russian 
economy cannot handle the increased financial responsibility of what the British call 
“continuous at sea deterrence,” and that the submarines will sit next to the pier, useless in 
disrepair. However, an SSBN physically unable to go to sea is not strategically irrelevant. 
A surfaced submarine is effectively a floating array of missile silos. As stated earlier, the 
Soviets developed intercontinental-range SLBMs that could be launched from SSBNs in 
port. A docked SSBN may therefore continue to be a formidable force.60  
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In 1996, Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev, Commander of the Northern Fleet, published 
an article describing the value of the SSBN fleet. In addition to the above mentioned 
advantages, he countered the argument that the SSBN force places a financial burden on 
the budget. At the time the article was published, there were 40 SSBNs in the Russian 
Fleet, and they still had 27 times fewer personnel than the Strategic Rocket Forces. He 
also stated that American experts had proved that sea-based forces are the more 
economical leg of the triad.61 An estimate made in 1995 by B.I. Pustovit, then the expert 
for the Committee for Military Technical Policy of the Ministry of Defense, stated that 
the spending on one warhead for the Strategic Rocket Forces would be 3.5 times more 
than for one warhead in the SSBN force by 2010.62 
2. Disadvantages 
While the stealth of the submarine is a great advantage for survivability, it also 
leads to a disadvantage in the eyes of conservative politicians. As Valery Yarynich has 
noted, “The exclusive right to authorize use of nuclear weapons belongs to the head of 
state,” and any loss of communications takes that ability away.63 All of this falls into the 
category of command, control, and communications, otherwise known as C3.  In order to 
maintain control of nuclear weapons the C3 structure must be maintained. The core 
aspects of C3 are trustworthiness, speed and ease of communications, and combat 
stability.64 The two of these most related to the SSBN force are trustworthiness and the 
speed and ease of communications.  
It is extremely difficult to communicate with a submerged SSBN, and there are 
times that there will be no communications. Other than normal radio communications the 
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submarine has the capability of receiving very long wave messages (VLW) and very low 
frequency messages (VLF). VLF messages can be transmitted at a depth of 200-300 
meters, but due to the long duration of the transmission they can only send codes and no 
specific launch orders. This would then require the submarine to go to communications 
depth (approximately 20 meters) to receive further instructions.65 This method of 
communications is mainly used as a backup emergency option. VLW messages can 
contain more information but they can only penetrate up to about 5 meters in depth, 
which would require the submarine to already be at communications depth or towing its 
external antenna, a position that is not normal while on a strategic patrol due to the 
increased risk of detection and reduced speed and lack of maneuverability of the 
submarine.66 
These communication issues are a factor due to the stringent controls that the 
Russians maintain over their nuclear weapons. The Russian system, which was 
previously the Soviet system, of controlling nuclear weapons has always been highly 
centralized; and the possibility of losing “negative control” does not exist.67 Negative 
control consists of measures to prevent “accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear 
missiles.”68 Contrary to the Russian system, on U.S. SSBNs the launch codes for the 
missiles are controlled on board and the Commanding Officer reportedly has the 
technical capability of launching his missiles without an order from the President.69 The 
Russians maintain more stringent controls: the codes to launch the SLBMs must be 
received from a higher command and are not released until the launch order is given.70 
While little is known about the exact C3 for Russia’s SSBN nuclear weapons, the 
communications difficulties constitute an impediment to the strict centralized control that 
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the RF prefers. As stated above, it has been calculated that it is significantly cheaper to 
maintain one warhead on an SLBM than on an ICBM. However, maintaining the 
launcher (the SSBN itself) is a much more expensive task than maintaining an equivalent 
number of ICBM silos. It has been reported that Russian SSBNs completed 20 percent 








Table 2.   Number of Russian SSBN Patrols per year.72 
 
Vladimir Shamanov, the chief of the combat training department of the Russian 
Armed Forces, attributes this diminishment to the poor quality of the submarines; they 
stay next to the pier because they are unreliable and not sea worthy.73 While this 
statement reflects the status of all submarines in the Russian fleet, the SSBNs are at the 
forefront of the issue. Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) and Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists state that 
“Russia’s general purpose submarine patrols increased only slightly, from four in 2006 to 
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seven in 2007—significantly fewer than the average of twelve patrols conducted each 
year during the 1990s.” 74 
With proper training, the SSBNs are able to conduct patrols “at the pier,” but this 
is not the intended function of a billion dollar submarine and the moored SSBN makes an 
excellent target for enemy strikes. The military must spend a significant portion of the 
annual defense budget to maintain the operational status of the submarines. As stated 
earlier, in order for the SSBNs to function during their entire estimated service life they 
must undergo an extensive, and more expensive, overhaul that takes them out of 
commission for approximately a year.  
Moreover, Russian policy requires that each patrolling SSBN have an SSN escort 
as it transits out to sea. When the SSBN gets underway, an SSN escort is utilized to 
conduct sweeps of its patrol path to ensure that there are no lurking enemy submarines 
standing by to track or destroy the SSBN.75 Additional funding is needed to ensure the 
operational functionality of SSBNs and SSNs, including their crews and support staff. 
The more patrols that the SSBNs make, the greater the quantity of assets required to 
ensure their functionality and security.  
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III. THE COMPETITION 
At the beginning of the nuclear era, airplanes were the primary delivery vehicle, 
and they have remained important delivery platforms in the arsenals of most nuclear-
weapon states. On 6 August 1945 the United States delivered the first nuclear bomb 
utilizing a bomber aircraft. On 15 May 1957 the world’s first ICBM was tested by the 
U.S.S.R. At the beginning of nuclear weapons development an ability to strike regional 
targets was a more immediate priority for the Soviets than being able to strike the United 
States homeland. This is why, although the Soviets first tested an ICBM in 1957, they 
focused on developing and deploying intermediate-range missiles and medium-range 
bombers for a majority of the next decade and first started to deploy ICBMs and long-
range bombers in substantial quantities only toward the end of the 1960s.76 Nevertheless, 
for the Soviets, the land- and air-based weapons were their nuclear cornerstone, and the 
first delivery system that they had capable of attacking U.S. soil was an intercontinental 
aircraft.77  
This preference in delivery platforms is still evident in Russia’s arsenal today. Of 
the 4,147 START-accountable nuclear warheads that the Russians reported having at the 
beginning of 2008, 64% of them are carried on either aircraft or land-based ICBMs.78 As 
Rose Gottemoeller has stated, “For most of Russia’s history, the oceans simply were not 
the country’s natural medium for warfare.”79 
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A. ICBMS 
1. Current Status 
In 1959, the Soviets formed the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), which are 
solely responsible for controlling and launching “all Soviet land-based missiles with 
ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers.”80 These forces continued the great legacy of Russian 
land armies and were considered to be the successors to the long-range artillerymen of 
the Russian Army.81 The RVSN has the prestige of being the only element of Russian 
intercontinental strike capabilities that is a separate branch of the armed forces of the 
Russian Federation.  
The RVSN is responsible for 2,027 deployed nuclear warheads, a number which 
equates to 49% of Russia’s entire arsenal.82 The majority of these warheads are carried 
on the 481 operational missile systems of four types - the SS-18, SS-19, SS-25, and SS-
27 - deployed throughout Russia.83 The missiles are either housed in silos or on mobile 
launchers. According to Irina Isakova, a freelance analyst and an Associate Fellow at the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, who previously served as a Specialist 
Adviser on Russia and the former Soviet Union to the House of Commons Defence 
Committee (2000-05) and as a foreign policy expert for the Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the  Russian Federation Council, Russia is planning to modernize its strategic forces 
and complete the plan by 2015 and after that the RVSN will not need any major 
modernization for another 30 years.84 
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a. SS-18 (Satan) 
This missile was originally designed and produced in the early 1970s and 
has undergone two series of improvements since then. In the early 1980s the original 
design (the R-36M) was replaced by a newer R-36MUTTH. The newer missile has many 
upgrades in relation to its predecessor, including a longer range, higher accuracy, and an 
increased number of warheads. Just as these missiles were being deployed, the designers 
completed another upgraded version of the Satan. This newer version, R-36M2, 
contained mostly design changes but did improve the accuracy over the R-36MUTTH. 
The R-36M2 missiles entered service early 1990s.85 
The SS-18 is a MIRVed missile and is deployed with 10 warheads per 
missile. The RF will start decommissioning the older R-36MUTTH missiles in 2008, but 
the R-36M2 missiles will stay in service until around 2020 when their 25 to 30 year 
service life will have expired. 86 In January 2008, an agreement between Russia and 
Ukraine on the maintenance of the missiles entered into force. The agreement, which was 
signed in February 2006, was ratified in January 2008, and will allow Moscow to extend 
the service life of these missiles to 25 years.87 The Russian Federation still reports having 
104 of these missiles, which are currently the only “heavy” ICBMs in the arsenal.88  
b. SS-19 (Stiletto) 
The Stiletto also went through a rapid series of modernizations similar to 
the Satan. The final version, UR-100NUTTH, was commissioned in 1979. These missiles 
are equipped with 6 warheads and the RF still maintains 122 of these missiles. 89 The 
service life of these missiles has been extended to 25 years through a series of test 
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launches, but that extension is quickly expiring. The last of these missiles were deployed 
in 1984, so they will probably be retired no later than 2009. The replacement missile for 
the Stiletto and the Satan, the RS-24 to be discussed shortly, is expected to enter service 
in 2009.90 
c. SS-25 (Topol) 
The Topol was the Soviet Union’s first road-mobile ICBM, and it is 
officially an updated version of the RT-2P silo based missile system. Due to restrictions 
of the 1979 SALT II treaty, which limited both sides to one new missile design, the SS-
25 had to be labeled an update; but Podvig states that this missile is in reality a new 
design and not a new version of an older missile.91 This mobile missile system was first 
deployed in 1988, and a series of test flights in 2007 extended its service life to 21 years 
and possibly up to 23 years.92 This is a single warhead system. Although the service life 
has been extended, SS-25 Topol missiles are being replaced by SS-27 Topol-M missiles 
as they are produced. As of January 2008 SS-25 Topol missiles constitute the majority of 
the ICBMs on Russian soil with 201 missiles and warheads.93 
d. SS-27 (Topol-M) 
In the early 1990s Russia began the design of a new single warhead ICBM 
suitable for mass production. Russian military authorities wanted the missile to be 
versatile and suitable for use in both silos and mobile launchers. SS-27 Topol-M missiles 
were first deployed in 1998, and are the only commissioned ICBMs actively produced in 
Russia today. Russia is building six to seven of these missiles each year and can continue 
to sustain that production rate for the foreseeable future. First Deputy Prime Minister 
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Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia cannot produce 30 missiles a year but does not need that 
many, a quantity that some experts hold necessary to maintain an adequate number of 
missiles.94 The RVSN currently has 48 silo-deployed SS-27 Topol-Ms and 6 mobile units 
deployed throughout the country.95 In his speech to the Federal Assembly in 2006, 
President Putin stated that, along with the Borey class submarines, the Topol-M will form 
the “backbone of our strategic deterrent force.”96 By 2015 Russia plans to acquire several 
dozen more silo-based Topol-Ms and 50 mobile systems.97 
e. RS-24 
Following Moscow’s announcement in June 2002 that Russia considered 
itself no longer bound by its signature and ratification of the START II treaty, the issue of 
MIRVed ICBMs was reintroduced. Under START II all MIRVed ICBMs would have 
been removed from service or the number of warheads would have been reduced so that 
there was only one warhead per missile. This would have put a substantial strain on the 
RVSN as the majority of the ICBM warheads were on the Satan and Stiletto missiles. 
With START II no longer an issue, Russia commenced designs on a MIRVed missile. 
According to Article V, paragraph 12, of the START I treaty, “each party undertakes not 
to increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or 
new type,” so Russia was required to build a new model.98 Similar in design to the Topol 
missile, the RS-24 is not a new missile, but an updated version of the Topol-M.99  
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While the RS-24 is extremely similar to the Topol-M, designating it as a 
new missile requires it to undergo extensive testing before it can be delivered to the 
RVSN. Two test flights were conducted in 2007 and the RVSN commander, Col. Gen. 
Nikolai Solovtsov, stated that the new missile will enter service in 2009.100 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of ICBM 
As with every delivery system, the ICBMs have their own set of advantages and 
disadvantages. The foremost advantage the ICBMs have over SLBMs is in their C3 
reliability. Unlike the SSBNs the ICBMs have a system that allows the RVSN main staff 
to maintain continuous monitoring and command of the missile regiments.101 The system 
in place is extremely redundant and consists of a main system, a reserve system, and 
another backup system. In addition, each missile army in the field has a “permanent 
hardened command center and an airborne reserve command center.”102 The chances of 
the RVSN losing control or communications connectivity are quite small. 
Another advantage that the ICBM force has over the SSBNs is the individualistic 
nature of the ICBMs. This is vital when it comes to repairs and maintenance periods for 
the ICBMs. If a silo- or mobile-based launcher fails to perform as required, the RVSN is 
only losing one missile and its associated warheads for the time it takes to repair it. While 
an SLBM can be removed from the SSBN for repairs, if the SSBN itself requires repairs, 
the RF might lose from service all the associated missiles and warheads on the boat 
during that period, depending on the type and severity of the repairs.  
As with the SSBNs, the total lifetime of an ICBM and its launcher is 
approximately 25 years. An advantage of the ICBM is that the replacement cost is 
significantly lower. Assuming that the silo is still in working order (as in the past the 
Russians use the silos from an older missile when replacing it with a newer one), the cost 
of replacing the missile is far less than that of building a completely new SSBN. 
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One of the biggest advantages of the SSBN is the biggest disadvantage of the 
ICBM force: the ability to remain hidden. The silo-based missiles can be located via 
satellites. Although the mobile launchers can be relocated, they may also be detected by 
satellite, reconnaissance over-flights, and radar systems.103 In theory, the silo-based 
Topol-M is capable of resisting a direct nuclear strike, but that cannot be actually 
confirmed.104 Any of the MIRVed missiles might be an attractive target in war.  
B. ALCM 
1. Current Status 
In 2007 Russian intercontinental bombers made the news as they recommenced 
their strategic patrols. For the first time in 15 years, the Bear and the Blackjack made 
patrols towards the United States in a fashion similar to their Cold War tactics of the 
1980s.105 Even though this leg of the strategic nuclear triad controls 15% of the START-
accountable warheads in the Russian Federation, intercontinental bombers were long 
disregarded as Russia struggled to reconstitute its military capabilities after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.106 
The strategic aircraft has always had a comparatively difficult time taking hold as 
a useful force in Russian planning for military operations. Strategic bombers in the 
United States paved the way for an independent Air Force in 1947. The concept of 
“independent air war had no support in Soviet military circles.”107 William Odom, a 
former director of the National Security Agency and an expert on the Soviet Union, wrote 
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that the military saw the role of the Soviet Air Forces as support for the ground forces 
and rejected the idea that air power could achieve victory.108 The lack of doctrinal 
support and a technological lag in the Soviet defense industry created a difficult start for 
Soviet strategic bombers.  
Influenced by the successes that the British and Americans had during World War 
II, the Soviets started to design their own fleet of bomber aircraft. The first such aircraft, 
the Tu-4, entered service in 1949 and in 1954 became the first class of planes to drop a 
Soviet nuclear bomb.109 Over the next couple of decades the Soviets put significant 
funding into improving the range of the aircraft and quickly developed intercontinental 
bombers. During this same period, the Soviets experimented with arming the planes with 
longer range cruise missiles in order to avoid anti-aircraft fire during their missions.  
a. Tu-95 (Bear) 
During the 1950s, the Soviets began to develop a long-range strategic 
bomber that would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the United States. After 
many design variations, the Soviets commissioned the Tu-95 in October 1957. This plane 
was initially limited to free-fall bombs but the Soviets quickly upgraded this plane to 
utilize cruise missiles and the Tu-95K was delivered in 1958.110 Over the next 30 years 
this plane was the backbone of the strategic aviation forces of the Soviet Union and 
benefited from many upgrades, concluding with the Tu-95MS aircraft that carry the KH-
55 cruise missile. There are two variants of this plane, one that carries 6 missiles in its 
bomb bay and another that can also carry an additional 10 under its wings.111 
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The Tu-95MS was built at a steady pace between 1984 and 1991 and is 
expected to remain in service until 2010-2015.112 The Russian Federation currently has 
64 each of the two models of the Tu-95MS with a total of 512 missiles and associated 
warheads.113 
b. Tu-160 (Blackjack) 
In the 1970s, the Soviets decided that they needed a supersonic strategic 
bomber and commenced research and development. The first modern bomber in Soviet 
history was the Tu-160 Blackjack, which started deploying in the late 1980s. These 
aircraft are capable of carrying 12 Kh-55 cruise missiles and being refueled in flight, 
increasing their range. 
At the beginning of 2008, the Russian Federation reported having 15 
operational Blackjack bombers with a total of 120 missiles and warheads.114 In January 
2008, it was reported that the Kazan Aviation Plant had completed a new Tu-160 aircraft 
and can produce 1 to 2 new aircraft every year. The goal for these aircraft is to reach a 
total of 30 by 2025.115   
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of ALCM 
In the realm of advantages and disadvantages, the strategic aircraft have many 
similarities to the SSBNs. When they are airborne, they have the potential to remain 
hidden, although they are easier to locate than SSBNs via radar systems and easier to 
track than SSBNs with high speed jet aircraft. While some observers speculated that the 
Russians were developing a stealth bomber, no such aircraft has been produced as of 
2008.116 Since each aircraft can carry at least six cruise missiles, this provides each 
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launcher with the ability to hit multiple targets, another advantage shared with the 
SSBNs. They also share a disadvantage with the SSBN force in that if the plane fails to 
operate, multiple missiles are consequently out of service. In addition, planes, like 
submarines, are also expensive to produce and costly to maintain. The aircraft also share 
the C3 disadvantage of the SSBNs. While it may be easier to maintain contact with an 
aircraft than a submarine, there is no redundancy in communications equivalent to that 
with the ICBMs, and the Russian leaders might lose contact with their bomber aircraft.117  
The strategic bombers have advantages and disadvantages distinct from those of 
other platforms. In the event of a surprise enemy attack, these aircraft can take off and 
avoid being destroyed and upload target information for the missiles while airborne. On 
the other hand, the planes are currently based at only two installations; and if they failed 
to take off quickly, they might be destroyed. According to Pavel Podvig, “During 
peacetime, however, the Soviet Union never kept its strategic bombers on alert with 
nuclear munitions. The Russian Long-Range Aviation presumably follows the Soviet 
practice.”118  
As stated earlier, these aircraft in 2007 resumed their strategic patrols after a 15 
year break in such operations. During this time period, there was a turnover of personnel, 
and now the strategic bomber force is left with a majority of junior pilots. In 2002 it was 
reported that due to funding shortages, these newly graduated pilots have had little 
experience in the cockpit.119 Lieutenant Colonel Gennadiy Stekachev, the commander of 
a Tu-95 strategic missile-equipped aircraft, states that prior to the resumption of the 
strategic patrols, his pilots would only receive about 40 hours of flight time per year 
versus the annual standard of 180 hours for U.S. pilots. However, this new era of 
strategic patrols has increased the annual flight time for the current crop of pilots to 80 to 
100 hours. He adds that, prior to the resumption of flight patrols, it took five years for a 
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pilot to be trained to operate a strategic bomber, but the Russians completely trained eight 
“young” crews in 2007.120 Inexperience could nonetheless be a major hindrance in the 
event that strategic bomber services were required. 
C. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES 
This last category is not part of the official nuclear strategic deterrent triad, but is 
a competitor to the SSBN force. In 2005, it was reported that Russia still maintained the 
SS-N-21 Sampson sea-launched cruise missile.121 This missile has a range of 3000 km 
and is launched from one of Russia’s many fast attack submarines. Moreover, according 
to some sources, it may be converted for launch from surface ships.122 While this missile 
has a small payload of 150kg, it can still be considered a deterrent threat as a nuclear 
warhead would cause massive damage and loss of life if launched at a major city.  
These missiles, as they are launched from a submarine, have the same advantages 
and disadvantages as an SSBN with the exception that the submarines used are dual 
purpose. These boats can carry out their primary mission as an SSN and when called 
upon launch their nuclear cruise missiles at their intended target. These missiles were due 
to be withdrawn based on the START II treaty, but now have a new potential of being 
utilized.123 
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IV. FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS  
In order for the nuclear triad to continue to exist and assist the Russian Federation 
in ensuring its security and pursuing worldwide prestige, there needs to be backing from 
both the political and military leaders of the country. Some signs of debate in this regard 
have been visible. Victor Yesin, a former head of the Military Department of the Security 
Council of Russia and a reserve Colonel-General of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops, 
has stated that the government is putting too much money into maintaining nuclear 
forces, that the threat of nuclear war is now negligible, and that Russia should proceed in 
the same manner as the French, who have eliminated their land-based nuclear missiles.124 
Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, has 
written that while the nuclear forces are vital to Russia, they should not be so prioritized 
that they hinder development of the country’s conventional forces.125  
When he was still serving as President, Vladimir Putin (who is now Prime 
Minister) stated that Russia plans to maintain the entire nuclear triad, and several experts 
believe that it will survive. “On March 30, 2006, President Putin, addressing a special 
meeting on the military nuclear complex, said that ‘analysis of the current international 
environment and prospective trends of its development determines that Russia should 
consider nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of its policy.’”126 Irina Isakova, a freelance 
analyst and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies in London, stated in 2006 that the nuclear program has received 100% 
funding over the last few years and that Russia will retain nuclear forces that are capable 
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of delivering an attack without having to base them in third countries.127  In contrast, in 
2000, at the start of the Putin era, Nikolai Sokov, a senior research associate at the Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, wrote that modernization of the nuclear triad was underway 
but at a slow pace. He also stated that under the plans at the time it would not be 
unexpected for Russia to transition to a dyad consisting of ICBMs and SLBMs.128 
Sokov’s comment was written prior to Russia’s decision not to feel bound by its signature 
and ratification of the START II treaty, in view of the fact that the United States regarded 
the conditions that Moscow attached to its instrument of ratification as unacceptable. 
START II would have prohibited MIRVed ICBMs, and this would probably have led 
Russia to place more emphasis on MIRVed SLBMs. 
This chapter focuses on the financial and political factors that will affect the 
development of the Russian Federation’s nuclear triad. Specifically, the chapter discusses 
the political goals that the leaders envision regarding the nuclear deterrent forces, 
including the size of the forces and the treaties limiting them; how defense spending has 
been changing and may need to be modified to support the nuclear forces; and national 
economic prospects and the capacity to support defense spending. 
A. POLITICAL FACTORS 
Dmitriy Litovkin, a commentator for the Russian newspaper Izvestiya, summed 
up the importance of nuclear forces in the view of many Russians as follows: 
ICBMs are Russia's ‘shield and sword.’  Weapons that have never been 
used in combat and, God grant, never will be used.  Nevertheless, today 
they play the main role in defending the country against any external 
aggression.  Hidden deep in the forests, impenetrable by warheads of any 
kind in concrete silos, or sited on mobile launchers, these systems can be 
launched and hit their targets whatever the situation.  No matter where the 
enemy may be or how he may hide, he will be destroyed.129 
                                                 
127  Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, 34. 
128  Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), 146. 
129 Izvestiya, “Moscow Puts Latest Russian Missile Tests in ‘Political Context’” 18 December 2007, 
reported and translated by OpenSource.gov 18 December 2007, CEP20071218021007. 
 43
1. Policies and Reform 
The “first use” policy of nuclear weapons in Russian security doctrine has been 
present since 1993. When President Putin published the National Security Concept in 
2000, his first as President, nuclear weapons were described as vital in ensuring the 
security and sovereignty of Russia. “The main task of the Russian Federation is to deter 
aggressions of any scale against it and its allies, including with the use of nuclear 
weapons.”130 While Russia desires cooperation with its Western counterparts, it will not 
sacrifice security to achieve this goal. One of the major points that Russia will not 
concede on is Western domination of nuclear or conventional military status.131 
In the Russian National Security Concept of 2000, some of the key points related 
to the functions of nuclear weapons include the following: 
• Nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent against aggressors at Russia or 
its allies and continue to be a major factor in international peace. 132 
• “The Russian Federation must have nuclear forces capable of delivering 
specified damage to any aggressor state or a coalition of states in any 
situation.” 
• “The use of all available means and forces, including nuclear weapons, in 
case of the need to repel an armed aggression when all other means of 
settling the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective.”133 
Even with these published policies, by the end of December 2000 the role of 
nuclear weapons had not been solidified in Russian military and political doctrine. 
During the summer of 2000, the military was having a heated debate on whether nuclear 
or conventional forces should dominate the country’s military priorities. The Chief of the 
General Staff at that time, Anatoly Kvashnin, had proposed that the military shift away 
from an emphasis on nuclear weapons and focus on improving conventional forces. 
According to Nikolai Sokov, this debate resulted in questions about a rapid 
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“denuclearization” of the defense policy, but at the time all indications showed otherwise. 
The evidence pointed to Russia commencing a gradual decline in its nuclear forces as the 
older weapons were decommissioned and the nuclear delivery systems were converted to 
carry conventional warheads.134 
It was not until the debacle in Chechnya during 2001-2002 that Russia started to 
re-focus on its nuclear arsenal. In his speech to the Federal Assembly in April 2001, 
President Putin stated that “only recently we were being told that our army is in a state of 
disintegration and that we should not hope for any shadow of military success.”135 This 
failure brought the inadequacies of the conventional military forces to the forefront. 
Russian leaders felt they had to remedy this situation because the military is one of the 
instruments of Russia’s global influence and because they were concerned about the 
eastward expansion of NATO.136 
It was clear to the Russian leaders that military reform was needed immediately. 
An important facet of the reform needs was the fact that public confidence in the military 
was waning. In 2002, Theodore Gerber, a professor of sociology at the University of 
Wisconsin–Madison, and Sarah Mendelson, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia 
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), conducted opinion 
polls among Russian citizens. They determined that only about half of the Russians 
surveyed had confidence in the military and that 68% of those surveyed believed that a 
political party’s views on military reform were important.137 Halfway through his first 
term, Putin needed to take action or he might have lost his public support. 
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In December 2001, the United States announced its intention to withdraw from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Although the U.S. decision was publicly 
justified by the expressed intention to intercept missiles that might be developed by rogue 
states such as Iran, Russia voiced its concern.  Russia had anticipated that the United 
States might withdraw from the ABM Treaty and made its ratification of the START II 
treaty in April 2000 conditional on continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty and on 
U.S. ratification of the 1997 protocols to the ABM Treaty. Moscow knew that these 
conditions were unacceptable to the United States and that ratification of START II with 
these conditions would almost certainly mean that START II would never enter into 
force.  
By dooming START II, the Russian leadership gave Russia’s nuclear forces a 
new lease on life. Many of the vestiges of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and its prestige, 
were saved. This included MIRVed ICBMs, which carried a majority of Moscow’s 
warhead arsenal. The conflict over the priority of conventional or nuclear forces within 
the Russian military ended with nuclear forces being the cost-effective victor. 
In his May 2003 speech to the Federal Assembly, President Putin addressed in 
detail the progress of military reform for the first time in his presidency. In this speech, 
Putin not only described the reforms in progress; he also spoke of the importance of the 
nuclear forces in Russia: “A serious part of reforms to the armed forces will be 
consolidation and modernization of our nuclear deterrent forces.”138 In July that same 
year, Putin again stressed the importance of the nuclear forces and their significance for 
the country’s status. He stated that “Russia must and will stay a great nuclear power” in 
speaking to scientists at the Federal Nuclear Center.139 
There is still the perception, dating back to Soviet and ancient Russian history, 
that the military is the cornerstone of Russian power and that a strong military creates a 
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strong state.140 This perception has a significant influence on developments because 
Russians generally want a strong military, but cannot afford the military that they desire. 
Until Russia can afford the conventional forces that it desires, Moscow will continue to 
invest heavily in nuclear forces. In a speech given at a meeting concerning the nuclear 
weapons complex, President Putin stated that Russians are “compelled to realize that 
nuclear deterrence is a key element in guaranteeing the country’s security. And the 
Russian nuclear weapons complex constitutes the material basis for this nuclear 
deterrence policy.”141 
In conformity with the National Security Concept of 2000, Russia has continued 
to emphasize the utility of nuclear weapons in ensuring national security and territorial 
integrity. In response to the continuing NATO enlargement process, Putin stated in 
November 2007 that “Russian nuclear forces would be ready with an adequate response 
to any aggressor.”142 Putin also characterized the tests of Russian ICBMs as a 
“substantial contribution to the strengthening of the country’s defense capability.”143 
Since the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the Russian government has 
expressed interest in improving its capabilities to penetrate missile defense systems. 
Isakova summed up Russian public statements about the new characteristics of the 
nuclear posture as follows: “balance, but not parity; minimal deterrence; asymmetric 
response; return of MIRVs; and, Russia’s possible unilateral withdrawal from the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty as a response to similar U.S. actions.”144 
                                                 
140 Steven E. Miller. “Introduction” in The Russian Military: Power and Policy, eds. Steven E. Miller 
and Dmitri Trenin, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004), 31. 
141 Vladimir Putin, “Opening Address at Meeting on Developing Russia's Nuclear Weapons 
Complex,” http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/03/30/2300_type82912type82913_104010.shtml 
(accessed 10 February 2008). 
142 Reuters “Putin reacts to NATO 'muscle-flexing',” Reuters, 20 November 2007.  
143 Vesti TV, “Putin says latest missile launches strengthen Russia's defence capability,” 26 
December 26, reported and translated by OpenSource.gov, 26 December 2007, CEP20071226950348. 
144 Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, 32. 
 47
2. U.S. & Russian Nuclear Arms Treaties 
The actual number of warheads that Russia needs to maintain “minimum 
deterrence” has not been published, but treaty commitments suggest how many Russia 
may deploy in the next several years. On 24 May 2002, Russia and the United States 
signed the Moscow Treaty (also known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty or 
SORT) that limits each side to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads on 31 December 2012. This treaty marks the lowest number of 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads that each country will have since the 
end of the Cold War.  
Prior to agreeing to conclude the Moscow Treaty, President Bush had expressed 
his desire to continue reducing the number of U.S. nuclear warheads unilaterally and did 
not see any need for a formal legally binding agreement. At President Putin’s request, the 
United States agreed to conclude the Moscow Treaty, but no formal agreements have yet 
been concluded to follow the START I treaty, which expires in December 2009, or the 
Moscow Treaty, which expires in December 2012. On 21 May 2008, John Rood, the 
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, gave 
insights about the current U.S. administration’s view on the future of nuclear arms 
control treaties between the United States and Russia: 
At present we have a difference of opinion with our Russian colleagues. 
Our view in the administration is that we want a treaty that will set limits 
on strategic nuclear warheads. We think that that is the appropriate focus 
of the follow-on treaty. Our Russian colleagues have sought a treaty with a 
broader scope, something which would also cover conventional 
armaments and conventional delivery systems and things of that nature. 
We are in the process of transitioning to a greater reliance on conventional 
weapons and a reduced reliance on nuclear forces. We therefore don't wish 
to expand the scope of the treaty in the manner -- or other legally binding 
agreement -- in the manner that our Russian colleagues have identified. 
Both sides, the Russians and the United States, do not wish to simply 
continue the existing START treaty. It's a phone book-size document of 
750 pages. The negotiations began under Brezhnev when he was leader of 
the Soviet Union and were concluded under Gorbachev. And so we both 
recognize they need to be updated as a minimum. 
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We in the United States would like another approach, as I said, that 
focuses on strategic nuclear warheads and sets limitations upon them.145 
Although this is a policy statement of the Bush administration, the 2008 
Presidential candidates have expressed interest in pursuing new arms control treaties with 
the Russians.146 
Why did Moscow insist on a legally binding treaty and not just unilaterally reduce 
its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads as the United States government 
would have preferred to do? While there are no definite answers to this question, one 
plausible reason could be the financial burden that the nuclear competition presents for 
the Russian economy. The START I treaty held both Russia and the United States to 
6,000 “accountable” warheads, an accomplishment reached in 2001.147 When START I 
entered into force into 1994, Russia already saw a warhead gap developing. When both 
sides reached their START I quota of warheads, the U.S. had 5,966 warheads against 
Russia’s 4,384 warheads.148 This gap was not a problem at the time since it was believed 
that START II would reduce both sides to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads.  
If the limits of START II had been reached (a hypothetical question since the 
treaty never entered into force), the United States would have had 3,456 warheads 
compared to Russia’s projected 3,253 warheads. Amy Woolf, a specialist in national 
defense for the Congressional Research Service, notes that this number for Russia would 
have required over 800 ICBMs, 13 ballistic missile submarines, and 78 aircraft. Most  
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analysts judged that this staggering number of delivery platforms would have been 
beyond the economic resources of the country (partly due to START II’s projected 
elimination of MIRVed ICBMs).149  
In July 2001, even before the START I numbers were achieved, President Bush 
and President Putin met in Genoa, Italy, in conjunction with a G-8 summit meeting and 
discussed the future of nuclear force reductions. While Russia desired a formal agreement 
that would limit each side to 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads, President Bush stated that 
he desired a unilateral reductions arrangement whereby each side could determine the 
appropriate number of warheads needed on its own. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and 
consent to the ratification of the START II treaty on 26 January 1996, but the Russian 
Duma refused to approve the treaty’s ratification until 14 April 2000. The Duma’s 
resolution of ratification added conditions that the Russians knew were unacceptable to 
the United States, as noted earlier. This failure of the START II treaty prompted 
President Putin to affirm Russia’s interest in legally binding constraints on the United 
States in another treaty. 
In November 2001, after a Department of Defense review of the U.S. nuclear 
posture, President Bush restated his intention to reduce U.S. forces to between 1,700 and 
2,200 “operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads over the next decade without a 
formal written agreement. President Putin restated that Russia planned to reduce the 
number of its warheads in this broad category to 1,500 but would prefer to use the formal 
arms control process to accomplish these goals.150 When formal discussions began in 
January 2002, Russia proposed counting rules, elimination rules, and verification 
methods similar to those used in the START treaties. Such an elaborate agreement was 
exactly what the United States did not want and refused to conclude, but in the end, 
Russia obtained what it really desired: a legally binding treaty. It seems plausible that one 
of Russia’s motives in seeking a legally binding treaty was prestige – appearing as the 
equal of the United States on the international stage. 
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According to the Moscow Treaty, by 31 December 2012 each side will have 
reduced its operationally deployed strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 
warheads.151 With the planned phase out of the Delta III submarines, SS-18 ICBMs, and 
SS-19 ICBMs, this will be an appropriate amount of warheads for the Russian defense 
budget. 
B.  FINANCIAL FACTORS 
1. Defense Budget 
Since Putin’s 2003 speech to the Federal Assembly, military reform has been 
underway, at a slow pace, but progress had been made. The focus has been on attempting 
to create a professional military, ensuring that the military is equipped with modern 
weaponry, and reworking military strategy for future potential conflicts. Russia is shifting 
away from the paradigm of world wars to localized conflicts. These reforms are not 
inexpensive, and the Russians have encountered major problems in accomplishing them. 
Although defense spending has dramatically increased over the Putin era, many reforms 
are continuing their struggle to receive adequate funding. 
Isakova reports that the 2004 budget allocated 2.56% of GDP to the defense 
industry and that in 2006 defense expenditures increased 1.3 times the 2005 amount.152 
Other sources report differing numbers for the defense budget. The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that Russian defense spending accounted for the 
following as a percentage of GDP: 4.23% in 2004, 3.72% in 2005, and 4.11% in 2006.153 
Julian Cooper, a Professor of Russian Economic Studies at the Centre for Russian and 
East European Studies of the University of Birmingham European Research Institute, 
analyzed the future budget published in Russia and found some differing results. He 
calculated, based on projected figures, that the 2007 defense budget dropped to 2.63% of 
GDP.  While the 2008 projected budget increased slightly to 2.74%, projections for 
                                                 
151 The White House, “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.” 
152 Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, 40. 
153 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008 (London: Routledge, 
2008), 209. 
 51
subsequent years show the percentage lowering again to 2.66%.154 While the percentages 
have not changed significantly, there are two main factors that minimize the differences. 
The first is that the IISS report states that “once inflation is factored in the actual rate of 
growth [in defense spending] has broadly matched growth in the economy at large.”155  
The second factor is the classification of “defense expenditure.” Certain items 
such as military pensions and paramilitary forces were not classified under defense 
expenses and the funds were provided from other sources. In 2004 these “extras” 
accounted for almost 1.5% of the GDP.156 Cooper also noted that the projected budget 
published in July 2007 for 2008-2010 included some major changes in classifications. He 
noted that the appendices relating to military and security issues were now classified as 
“top secret” and not available to many of the lawmakers approving the budget. This re-
classification did not only affect military spending. Cooper noted that 58% of the 
specifics in the budget expenditure were not openly published.157 
The secretive nature of the military also affects the allocation of funds. Alexei 
Arbatov, currently a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center but previously Deputy 
Chairman of the Duma’s Defense Committee, states that if the parliament and public 
were told about the technical problems in the armed forces and the “inadequacy of the 
state armaments program (which is top secret),” pressure could be provided in the right 
places to ensure that proper funding was available.158 Since a significant portion of the 
proposed budget for 2008-2010 is classified, there is no way to ensure that proper 
funding is being pushed into vital areas. 
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While defense spending has more than doubled in nominal terms since 2003, one 
of the reasons for reform struggles may be that the priorities on spending are not properly 
aligned.159 Over the last 5 years the percentage of defense rubles spent on research and 
development (R&D) and procurement versus personnel has been shifting away from the 
personnel. In the past the ratio had 70 percent of the money going to personnel, and in 
2006 only 60% of the funds were allocated for personnel. The goal is to achieve a 50-50 
ratio through 2010-2011.160 Cooper states that, based on the projected budget for 2008-
2010, R&D and procurement continue to be the top priorities and receive the majority of 
the defense budget.161 
Arbatov stated in April 2008 that since the defense budget of the RF is “25 times 
smaller than that of the United States, and is even more meager as compared to the 
consolidated defense budget of all the NATO countries,” a conventional arms race with 
the United States would be an economic disaster that could undermine “the living 
standard of the population to such a degree that African poverty would look like 
prosperity.”162 Arbatov proposed that, based on the published military doctrine, the 
pursuit of a strengthened nuclear force structure would be more beneficial.  Based on the 
proposed budgets Arbatov’s recommendations appear to be consistent with the decisions 
by the political leadership of the RF in that the one area of the Russian defense budget 
not taking any cuts is the nuclear forces. In the 2007 budget, the nuclear forces received 
12,099 billion rubles and each year these figures are projected to rise. By 2010, the 
amount of money that these forces receive will have more than doubled in nominal terms 
to 25,256 billion rubles. Cooper relates these increases to plans to develop and 
commission new land- and sea-based platforms in the upcoming years.163 The focus of 
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Russian spending is to maintain the nuclear triad, but with the majority of the money 
going to the land- and sea-based legs of the triad. Isakova stated in 2006 that the current 
program is projected to focus on these two legs of the triad until the 2015-2020 
timeframe and that the nuclear forces have received 100% of the money that they have 
requested over the last several years.164 
2. Financial Impediments 
While the numbers show that nuclear forces are receiving more money every year 
and appear to be a main priority of the Russian military, there are signs that show that the 
money is not being applied effectively in this area either. At the same time that more 
money is being poured into the development and procurement of new forces, the bases 
that house Russian SSBNs when they are not at sea are having significant maintenance 
and financial difficulties. One major problem facing the nuclear forces at their bases is 
the influx of organized crime. These criminals and the workers that supply them with 
materials are supplementing their income by dealing on the black market. Among the 
items being stolen are scrap metal for repairs and palladium for construction. However, 
the theft of uranium intended for the nuclear reactor has raised the greatest concern.165  
One of the factors explaining these thefts may be the low pay of the military. The 
military is underpaid and short of junior officers. Pay raises have for the most part been 
outpaced by inflation. In real purchasing power the pay raises have been negligible. In 
addition to the poor pay, the military’s lack of adequate housing obliges servicemen to 
pay out of pocket for their homes. These situations place the officers and servicemen 
under financial strain and may increase the risk of crime and corruption.166  
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The Russian military has started to recognize this problem, and plans are in place 
to correct the deficiency. In 2007 the pay went up 10% on 1 January, and 15% on 1 
December; and a new food ration was introduced to the servicemen. These three “raises” 
amount to a 30% increase in pay during 2007. As for the housing shortage, the military 
delivered 42,000 apartments for personnel. Plans for 2008 show no sign of slowing down 
in that the government intends to pursue new means of improving the standard of living 
for military personnel. Among the changes are new standards of food provisions, new 
contracts for permanent housing, a mortgage savings system, and another 15% pay raise 
for September 2008.167 
Another indication of continuing shortcomings in financial support for the nuclear 
forces is the physical status of the bases. The bases do not have the financial means 
necessary to maintain their infrastructure. In several instances the bases do not even have 
the financial means required to continue their electric service.  This situation is 
significant at all military installations, but even worse at nuclear facilities. A power 
failure at a base that services nuclear vessels may degrade the functioning of vital 
components that are necessary to ensure reactor safety. There have been several reports 
of near accidents with nuclear reactors due to power failure. Moreover, the loss of heat at 
one base was causing the liquid cooling in the nuclear reactors to freeze.168 
The financial situation has deteriorated to such an extent in certain areas that 
neighboring towns informally adopted bases and their personnel. It was reported that at 
the end of 2003 crime, terrorist threats, and other physical and financial problems around 
Russia had created a situation in which the Saratov Oblast region was the only secure 
location for the military to deploy the new Topol-M ICBMs.169 The military reportedly 
did not receive enough funding for these ICBMs and their personnel and had to rely on 
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the town of Saratov for support.170 According to James Clay Moltz, "City governments 
have taken over critical supply functions for the Russian nuclear navy."171  
This situation is dangerous in the current state of international terrorism. An 
extreme example was observed in 1998. A military base in Krasnoyarsk Kray had not 
received its funding and the personnel manning the base were not being paid. The 
governor of the region, fed up with the military’s financial inadequacies, decided to 
threaten to assume control of all the nuclear weapons in the region until the problem was 
resolved.172 The governor in question, Aleksandr Lebed, declared: "Officers of the Uzhur 
rocket formation have not received their allowances for five months and their wives are 
storming the headquarters. It is a serious formation and the officers are serious. And I am 
seriously thinking of establishing territorial jurisdiction over it. We in Krasnoyarsk are 
not rich yet, but in exchange for the status of a nuclear territory we could feed the 
formation and become a headache for the world community along with India and 
Pakistan.”173 While no physical action resulted from the threat, it shows the financial 
dilemma that the Russian government faced. 
3. Financial Security 
The defense budget for 2008-2010 is based on an increasing GDP with a growth 
rate averaging about 6 percent a year through 2010. With the current high oil and gas 
prices and the seemingly insatiable global thirst for these energy resources, Russia is 
poised to become an even greater financial powerhouse. Can Russia maintain this 
economic performance in the coming years, or is it stretching what is sometimes referred 
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to as a “virtual economy”?174 Is Russia a petrostate that will be in distress if oil prices 
collapse or is its economy diverse enough to withstand an oil price drop? 
The World Bank reports that from 1998 through 2006 the Russian GDP grew 
almost 60% and the poverty rate in the country was cut in half.175 Even with these 
impressive improvements in the country’s financial performance, inflation has plagued 
the economy for the last decade. According to a report by the International Monetary 
Fund, “After an initial rapid decline from about 30 percent in 2000 to close to 10 percent 
in 2003, annual headline consumer price inflation became entrenched at 10–14 percent 
until early 2005.” In 2006 inflation in Russia was only down to 9.7%, which was the 
highest level in all Central and Eastern European countries. 176 The inflation rate settled 
at 7.8 percent in May 2007, and it is expected to stay around 7 percent through 2009.177 
Even with this inflation rate, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits high 
oil prices and a better financial plan with assisting the massive growth in the Russian 
economy. In 2006, when oil prices reached approximately $75 per barrel, the IMF 
reported, the sound fiscal plans of the Russian government would have had a balanced 
budget at $30 per barrel.178 Even with these successes, the IMF has been cautious about 
the future prospects of the Russian economy. According to the IMF, although there has 
been impressive growth in the economy, foreign investment in the country has been low. 
Moreover, the IMF noted, “capital and labor have accounted for less than half of the 
                                                 
174 Barry Ickes and Clifford Gaddy, “The Virtual Economy and Rconomic Recovery in Russia” 
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177 International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; 
Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion,” IMF Country Report 
351, October 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07351.pdf, (accessed 18 February 
2008), 9. 
178 Ibid., 3. 
 57
increase in GDP since 2003.”179 The projected GDP growth that the 3-year budget signed 
by President Putin in 2007 utilizes is consistent with the forecasts of the IMF.180 
Although the IMF has indicated that the short-term prospect of the Russian 
economy is good, the IMF has stated that changes need to be made to ensure long term 
stability. The 2006 budget that was balanced based on a $30 per barrel oil price is quickly 
being superseded. To accomplish the same budget balance in 2009, the oil prices will 
need to be at $55-$60 per barrel due to the inflation rate and the increased spending of the 
government. 181 As of June 2008 the price per barrel was approximately $138, with no 
forecasts of significant decreases. This price will provide for a cash influx and an 
excellent buffer against any potential financial downturns. Although the government has 
estimated that the stabilization fund will be at 3.9 trillion rubles in 2009, this amount 
would not last long in the event of a collapse in oil prices in a country in which the 
annual expenditure in 2007 was close to 5.5 trillion rubles.182  
In order to lessen its dependence on high oil prices, the Russian Federation has 
been reducing its reliance on oil as the prime source of income. In 2006, oil accounted for 
11.2 percent of total revenues. This was reduced to 9 percent in 2007, and it is projected 
to be down to 7.2 percent in 2009.183 In order to diversify the country’s exports, the 
Russian military-industrial sector has been a major supplier of arms and military 
equipment worldwide. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has estimated that in 
2006, Russian arms exports totaled approximately $6.4 billion and that new contracts 
totaled approximately $8.7 billion. This amounted to 21% of the global market and was 
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second only to the United States in arms exports.184 While these figures fall far short of 
the amounts brought in by energy exports, diversification is essential to Russia’s 
maintenance of its economic performance. 
 
 
                                                 
184 Congressional Research Service cited in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Russian 
Military 2008, 210. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Russia probably places more responsibility on its nuclear forces than any other 
country. Nuclear weapons are held in the highest regard and command respect on all 
sides of the political spectrum. In 2005, the Russian Orthodox Church named historic 
Russian Admiral Fyodor Ushakov the patron saint of the Russian bomber force.185 At a 
time when the Russian conventional forces are struggling to regain their place in the 
world military ranking, nuclear forces constitute the backbone of Russian security.  
In 1999-2000 the Russian government underwent significant political changes. 
Russian journalist Dmitriy Yevstafyev wrote in March 2000 that “parliamentary elections 
only confirmed once and for all that a consensus has formed in the country to the effect 
that a tougher policy has to be followed toward the West in order to elevate the status of 
the state and its citizens.”186 He added that part of this consensus was that the nuclear 
forces were vital to ensure Russian global influence and that “they are the guarantee 
against pressure on us from NATO.”187  
In recent years, the military has been conducting operations that simulate nuclear 
attacks in response to supposed NATO encroachment and invasion.188 In 2004, retired 
General Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow, 
said, “In the current situation, the role of nuclear weapons for Russia is hard to 
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National Institute Press, 2006), 9; Nikolai Sokov, “Chronology of Significant Military Maneuvers,” August 
2004, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/maneuver.htm (accessed 20 July 2008). 
 60
overestimate. Basically it is the only factor which can still ensure our country's safety. 
We have nothing else to repel strategic military threats anymore.”189 
The problem is that the Russian goals may exceed the country’s capabilities. 
Mark Schneider, a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, has pointed 
out that the nuclear program under the Yeltsin regime was based on new technology and 
that improved systems were to be produced every 10 years. However, the country could 
not support this financially, and as of 2000 many systems had exceeded their planned 
service lives and had to be replaced.190 While the Russian military budget has been 
substantially increased in recent years due to massive oil price increases, it takes time to 
revitalize the nuclear forces. Due to delays in modernization, more nuclear assets are 
being decommissioned than are being deployed. In 2003 Aleksey Arbatov, head of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences Center for International Security, stated that the Moscow 
Treaty would not limit the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons 
for Russia as the country would be financially limited to fewer weapons than the ceiling 
prescribed by the treaty.191 In 2012, when the treaty expires, Russia will not have 
commissioned enough new weapons to compensate for the loss of older weapons. 
The current START I data indicate that the Russian Federation has 4,147 nuclear 
warheads deployed on 848 launchers or bombers. This is almost double the Moscow 
Treaty allowable ceiling of 2,200 warheads by 31 December 2012. As discussed in 
Chapters II and III, these numbers are declining rapidly: 
• 732 warheads attributed to the SS-19 (Stiletto) ICBM force are expected to 
be retired no later that 2009. 
• The 23 year life extension of the SS-25 (Topol) ICBM force and its 201 
warheads will start to expire in 2011. 
• The 512 warheads associated with the Tu-95MS (Bear) bombers will start 
to be decommissioned in 2010. 
                                                 
189 Gareyev quoted in David Holley, “Russia Seeks Safety in Nuclear Arms” Los Angeles Times, 6 
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191 Moscow Vremya Novostey “Russian Stability Expert Arbatov Sees UN Security Council Authority 
Enhanced” 20 March 2003, reported and translated by OpenSource.gov 20 March 2003, 
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• The 288 warheads associated with the Project 667BDR (Delta III) 
submarines are expected to be decommissioned shortly. 
Current military plans envisage the annual production of six or seven Topol-M 
ICBMs, and one or two Blackjack bombers as well as the completion of three Project 955 
(Borey) submarines. By the year 2015, with no changes to the plan, this would give the 
Russian Federation approximately 600 warheads attributed to SLBMs (30%); 1,143 
warheads attributed to ICBMs (58%); and 240 warheads attributed to ALCMs (12%) for 
a total warhead count of 1,983.192 This shows that since Arbatov’s statement in 2003 
changes have been made to the production rate of certain nuclear forces and the Russian 
Federation has renewed its efforts to maintain its nuclear posture. While Arbatov appears 
to have been incorrect in his forecast about the financial strain on the Russian defense 
budget, if it were not for the ceilings codified in the Moscow Treaty, the Russian 
Federation might have been substantially outnumbered by the United States in numbers 
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.193  
As stated in Chapter III, since the 1960s the ICBMs have been the dominant 
nuclear force in Russia. These missiles provide a cost effective method of maintaining 
global military might, meet the requirements of localized nuclear command and control, 
and uphold the country’s superpower status. As long as Russia maintains 
intercontinental-range nuclear forces, the ICBMs will probably carry the majority of the 
warhead inventory in this range category. In the battle for survival, the SLBMs and 
ALCMs are the most likely potential losers.  
When the two platforms – submarines and aircraft - are compared, it is difficult to 
determine which would be the better option to complement the ICBMs for the future of 
the intercontinental-range nuclear forces in the Russian Federation. With no public 
                                                 
192 This projection is based on the following assumptions: all Project 667BDR (Delta III) submarines 
decommissioned, the Project 941 (Typhoon) decommissioned, three Project 955 (Borey) submarines 
commissioned, all SS-19 (Stiletto) and SS-25 (Topol) ICBMs decommissioned, seven  SS-27 (Topol-M) 
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and a total of 30 Tu-160 (Blackjack) aircraft in 2015. 
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statements declaring an intention to phase out either platform, and new bombers and 
submarines being built, there is no indication that either will be discontinued. It will 
nonetheless be necessary for the military leaders of both the SSBNs and bomber aircraft 
to fight for their respective force’s survival.  
The strategic bomber forces are being phased to consist only of Tu-160 
(Blackjack) aircraft. The fleet currently consists of 15 aircraft with 1 or 2 additional 
produced per year. The continuation of this plan depends on the ability of the government 
to ensure that the defense budget is supplied with the requisite funding. If the Russian 
Federation experiences another collapse of the financial sector, as was seen in 1998, the 
military budget could drop significantly and the government might abandon new aircraft 
production. 
The same can be said for the production of the new SSBNs. As discussed in 
Chapter II, there are only three Project 955 (Borey) class submarines in construction. 
These submarines have been under construction since 1996, and as of July 2008 none has 
completed sea trials. This is partly due to the delays in the development and production of 
the Bulava missile, which is not expected to be ready for operational deployment until 
2009. These submarines were also delayed significantly during the financial crisis of 
1998 when construction of the Yuri Dolguruky was halted due to lack of funding.  
Fortunately for the SSBNs and strategic bombers, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
there currently is no money shortage; and with the continued global demand for oil, it 
appears that no shortage is on the horizon. The Russian Federation appears to have 
learned from its mistakes in the late 1990s, and it has started to accumulate massive 
reserve funds that might (if sufficient funds were reserved) carry it through a crisis.  
In addition to the financial capability to maintain the nuclear forces, the essential 
political support is also present. The previous Russian President and current Prime 
Minister, Vladimir Putin, has openly supported the nuclear forces and stated that they are 
necessary to ensure the security and sovereignty of Russia. The new Russian president, 
Dmitri Medvedev, has made no public announcements that would change the stance of 
the previous administration nor alter the Russian military doctrine of 2000.  
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Although current construction plans do not shed a kind light on the future of the 
SSBN force, Russia’s leaders apparently regard these strategic weapons as indispensable 
elements of a strong deterrent force that is needed to compensate for the poor condition 
of the country’s conventional forces. The SSBN’s advantages, such as survivability 
through stealth and payload capability, will continue to overshadow the disadvantages. 
With the current financial stability of the Russian economy and the prospects of 
continuing high oil prices the main disadvantage – cost – will no longer be as significant.  
It appears that the SSBN force is shrinking to a radically minimal level with the 
few operational submarines that remain and the even fewer in construction. Given the 
fact that the Russians have been engaged in constructing and operating SSBNs for over 
50 years, they probably have a plan that has not yet been made public. Once they resolve 
the current developmental problems with the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile, it is 
entirely plausible that they may undertake massive construction efforts comparable in 
some ways to Cold War production patterns. While the Russian military may decide to 
restructure the nuclear forces, the SSBN force will probably continue to be a prominent 
component of these forces for many years to come. 
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